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PUTTING THE “PUBLIC” BACK IN “PUBLIC USE”
INTERPRETING THE 2011 LEAHY-SMITH
AMERICA INVENTS ACT
Joseph A. Lingenfelter*
INTRODUCTION
Eolas1 Technologies (Eolas) approaches you, a potential investor,
and explains that Michael Doyle and his University of California San
Francisco team invented the first web browser that supports plugins. 2 After the investment pitch, you realize the importance of the
invention. You perform due diligence on the claimed invention and
the patent looks legitimate. After some back and forth with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and some
amended claim language, Eolas secures a patent on this monumental
innovation to website development.3 You decide, “I’m in.”
Several years later, after a jury awards Eolas $520 million in
damages against corporate giant Microsoft Corporation, three judges
decide that a conversation Pei-Yuan Wei had with two engineers at
Sun Microsystems can invalidate the patent. 4 “Who is Wei?” you
might wonder. Wei invented a similar software design that supported

*

J.D., Boston University School of Law, 2014; B.S. Aerospace Engineering, Boston University College
of Engineering, 2011. Special thanks to the Boston University School of Law, to Professor Michael
Meurer for his wise counsel in the research and preparation of this article, and to the Georgia State
University Law Review for preparing this article for publication. I would also like to thank my wife,
Theresa, for her continuous support.
1. Irish for “knowledge.” Products, EOLAS, http://eolas.com/technologies.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2014). The acronym stands for “Embedded Objects Linked Across Systems.” Id.
2. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005). A plug-in is a
software component that embeds a particular feature within an existing software application. See Check
Your Plugins, MOZILLA, https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/plugincheck/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). Plugins allow users to customize a software application. Id. Some well-known plug-ins are Adobe Flash,
QuickTime, and Java. Id.
3. See Eric Bangerman, Microsoft, Eolas May Close the Books on Browser Plug-in Patent Fight,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 2, 2007 11:32 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2007/08/microsoft-eolasmay-close-the-books-on-browser-plug-in-patent-fight/.
4. Eolas Techs., Inc., 399 F.3d at 1332–33.
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plug-ins.5 No, Wei did not file for a patent.6 No, Wei did not share
his invention with the world.7 All Wei did was show two engineers
that he developed a browser that supported plug-ins.8 And there goes
your investment. 9 The patent is invalid, and Eolas cannot exclude
others from using its revolutionary web-browsing tool.10
The goal of the patent system, as defined by America’s founding
fathers, is “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 11 The right to
exclude others from making, using, and selling the patented
technology in the United States, granted by 35 U.S.C. § 154, creates
a limited monopoly, which in turn provides a financial incentive to
the inventor or assignee of the patent rights.12 The promise of this
5. See John Ribeiro, Patent Firm Eolas Loses Appeal in Web Patents Lawsuit, COMPUTERWORLD
(July 23, 2013, 3:12 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2484193/technology-lawregulation/patent-firm-eolas-loses-appeal-in-web-patents-lawsuit.html (noting Wei created a program
called “Viola”).
6. Cf. Eolas Techs., Inc., 399 F.3d at 1329 (noting that Wei invented the Viola web browser,
demonstrated it to two engineers at Sun Microsystems, and later made a new version of Viola).
7. See id. at 1329–30. Wei did publish a paper on the Internet describing his invention, at least by
Aug. 1994. Id. at 1330. However, this publication was well within the one-year grace period provided
by the Patent Act prior to 2013. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). Diligent inventors and investors know
that such a publication cannot erect a bar to patentability. See id. (denying patent protection to claimed
inventions in a printed publication or in public use more than one year prior to the effective application
date of the patent).
8. See Joe Mullin, The Web’s Longest Nightmare Ends: Eolas’ Patents are Dead on Appeal, ARS
TECHNICA (July 22, 2013 10:41 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/the-webs-longestnightmare-ends-eolas-patents-are-dead-on-appeal/ (explaining that Wei demonstrated his software
programs to engineers at Sun Microsystems).
9. After the Federal Circuit overturned the $565 million judgment in the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eloas settled with Microsoft for $100 million dollars. Id. Had Microsoft
refused the settlement, it is likely that that Eolas would have walked away with an invalid patent and
millions of dollars in litigation costs. Indeed, when Eolas sued Adobe Systems Inc., Amazon.com Inc.,
CDW Corp., Citigroup Inc., The Go Daddy Group, Inc., Google Inc., J.C. Penney Corp., Inc., Staples,
Inc., Yahoo! Inc., and Youtube, LLC, in the Eastern District of Texas, the Federal Circuit upheld a jury
verdict that Eolas’s patent lacked novelty due to Wei’s public use and was invalid. Eolas Techs. Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 521 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished).
10. See Ribeiro, supra note 5.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Edward C. Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the United
States Came to Have a “First-to-Invent” Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 280–81 (1995).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (citing Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)).
[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the
creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for
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reward is often essential to the development of technology in the first
place. 13 Accordingly, without confidence in the patent system’s
promise to reward, many inventors would not invent and many
investors would not finance developments in “Science and useful
Arts.”14 In the Eolas example,15 the one hundred investors would not
have purchased stock in the company if they did not believe there
was a substantial likelihood that they would be financially rewarded.
In the last twenty years, at least twenty-four other cases before the
Federal Circuit involved alleged third party “public use.”16 At least
eight of these patents were invalidated by hidden, inaccessible, third
party use.17 Many more cases involving alleged third party public use
occurred in the federal district courts throughout the United States.18
Examples like Eolas stifle innovation because they make it difficult
to predict whether a patent satisfies the novelty requirement and
make investing in technology too risky.19
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA), which took
effect on March 16, 2013, poses a serious threat to the efficacy of the
U.S. patent system.20 The AIA converted the patent system from a
first-to-invent into a first-inventor-to-file system,21 harmonizing the
American system with the rest of the world. Accompanying this
major transition, the AIA removed the automatic, one-year grace
an exclusive monopoly The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and
enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one hand, and the
interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has
been a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception.
Id.
13. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977) (arguing that no one will invest the time and money into an invention without the
possibility of future returns).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. See supra text accompanying notes 1–9.
16. See infra note 178.
17. See infra note 179.
18. E.g., MRC Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter MFG, LLP, 921 F. Supp. 2d 800, 805 (N.D. Ohio 2013);
Seed Research Equip. Solutions v. Gary W. Clem, Inc., No. 09-0282-EFM-KGG, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 181381, at *12–13 (D. Kan. 2012); Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby
Prods., L.L.C., No. 09-C-0916, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167945, at *20 (E.D. Wis. 2012).
19. See supra text accompanying notes 4–14.
20. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.112-29, § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011).
21. Id.
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period for third party public use events and removed the “in this
country” limitation on the public use statutory bar.22 These changes
dramatically increase the scope of activity that may erect the public
use statutory bar.23 For example, to invalidate the Eolas patent, Wei’s
conversation with his colleagues must have occurred in the United
States and more than one year before Doyle filed the patent
application. 24 After the enactment of the AIA, that conversation
could have taken place anywhere in the world and just moments
before Doyle filed the patent application. Although the problem of
hidden, inaccessible, private third party public use has not noticeably
suppressed innovation in the past, 25 the new breadth of the AIA
public use category threatens to do so in the future because nearly
secret uses of technology, occurring anywhere in the world, will
invalidate dramatically more patents. Thus, retaining the old
definition of public use may be “fairly disastrous for the U.S. patent
system.”26
Part I of this paper discusses the development of the § 102(b)
public use statutory bar and reveals that the pre-AIA interpretation of
“public use . . . includes any public use of the claimed invention by a
person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction,
or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.” 27 Under that definition,
hidden, inaccessible, private third party uses of the patented
technology constitute patent-invalidating prior art under the public
use statutory bar. Part II argues that the plain language and the
legislative history of the AIA support a narrower interpretation of the
term public use. Moreover, Part II advocates that employing the preAIA definition of public use will make it impossible to predict
whether a patent issued by the USPTO satisfies the novelty
requirement because a third party may have nearly secretly used the
22. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text; 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
25. See supra text accompanying notes 16–18.
26. 157 CONG. REC. S34, 1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
27. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation omitted).
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patented-technology anywhere in the world.28 To increase notice and
predictability in the patent system, public use under the AIA should
exclude these hidden, inaccessible, private actions by third-parties.
Part III discusses issues raised by such an interpretation: should the
same definition of public use apply when dealing with first party
nearly secret uses? 29 Should an inventor’s own secret commercial
exploitation of his invention forfeit his or her right to patent the
invention? Should the “on sale” bar under the AIA exclude hidden,
inaccessible, private sales of an invention by a third party? If the term
public use excludes these nearly secret uses, how should courts
define public use under the AIA?
I. THE PUBLIC USE STATUTORY BAR
A. Novelty, Statutory Bars, and Nonobviousness
To receive patent protection—the right to exclude others from
making, using, selling, and offering to sell the patented technology—
the invention must satisfy the five basic conditions of patentability:
the invention must be (1) patentable subject matter,30 (2) useful,31 (3)
new, 32 (4) nonobvious, 33 and (5) the patent application must
28. See discussion infra Part II.
29. See discussion infra Part III.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (requiring that an invention be a “new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof”). Although the
category of patentable subject matter is very broad, the three specific unpatentable subject matters are
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o
promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts”) (emphasis added). Patents are unavailable for
abstract discoveries or inventions which may be useful. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–29, 536
(1966) (“[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its
successful conclusion.”).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); see infra text accompanying notes 35–41.
33. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012):
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would
have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.
Id. In making the § 103 nonobviousness determination, courts determine the following, as of the date of
the invention: (1) the scope and content of the prior art at the time of the invention; (2) the differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
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adequately disclose the invention.34 To satisfy the third requirement
(the novelty requirement), the claimed invention must be new relative
to the activity of others prior to the critical date.35 Before Congress
enacted the AIA, the Patent Act provided that a person is not entitled
to a patent if:
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent,
or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale
in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States . . . .36
The pre-AIA § 102(b) requirements are referred to as statutory
bars and the pre-AIA § 102(a) requirements embody the priority
right—the first person to invent something new has the exclusive
right to patent his invention.37
When an invention is in public use in the United States or
described in a printed publication anywhere in the world more than a
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). Secondary considerations such as
“commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.” Id. at 17–18.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same . . . .”). This is referred to as the “enablement requirement”:
The term “undue experimentation” does not appear in the statute, but it is well
established that enablement requires that the specification teach those in the art to make
and use the invention without undue experimentation . . . . Factors to be considered in
determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation . . . [i]nclude (1)
the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the
invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). In addition, “[e]very patent must
describe an invention.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(holding this is “a separate requirement”).
35. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
37. Id. However, if the first person to invent abandons, suppresses, or conceals his invention, a
subsequent inventor can patent the invention. Id. § 102(g).
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year before the inventor files his patent application, the claimed
invention is anticipated.38 The public use event or printed publication
description is referred to as a prior art reference. 39 For a prior art
reference to anticipate an invention, it must satisfy the all elements
rule.40 The all elements rule requires that a single prior art reference
includes each element of the claimed invention41 and courts strictly
apply this rule.
If a prior art reference does not satisfy the all elements rule (i.e. it
is missing one or more of the limitations in the claimed invention) the
patentee may still not be entitled to a patent because, in addition to
being novel, the invention must be nonobvious. The nonobviousness
requirement provides that a claimed invention is not patentable if the
differences between the new invention and the prior art reference
would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the
art. 42 In some circumstances, a patent examiner or a court can
combine different prior art references to render the claimed invention
obvious.43
B. Patent Policies Underlying the Public Use Statutory Bar
Four patent law policies justify application of the public use
statutory bar: quid pro quo, channeling, prompt disclosure, and
detrimental public reliance.44 The quid pro quo rationale advocates
38. Id. § 102(a)-(b) (2006).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). Prior art is not limited to public use events or descriptions in
printed publications. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). The term of art includes any event or reference
specified in § 102(b) that may bar an application or invalidate a patent granted by the USPTO. Id. In
addition to public use and printed publications, prior art includes “on sale” activity in the United States
more than one year before the application for the patent. Id.
40. E.g., Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
41. Id.
42. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a
whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”).
43. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 425 (2007) (combining a prior art
reference teaching the usefulness of placing a sensor on a car’s pedal device with another reference
teaching how to solve a wire-chaffing problem related to placing the sensor in that location).
44. Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“We have enumerated the
policies underlying section 102(b) . . . as follows: (1) discouraging the removal, from the public domain,
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on behalf of the general public, demanding that society receive a
benefit in exchange for the benefits granted to the inventor. 45 The
patentee reaps the exclusive right to make, use, sell and offer to sell
the claimed invention. 46 In return for this limited monopoly right,
society profits from the use of the new invention (made and sold by
the patent holder) and from future improvements made to the
invention. 47 Society also receives the benefit of unrestricted
manufacture and use of the patented technology after the patent term
expires. 48 The public use statutory bar ensures that the patented
innovation was not already publicly used.49 This rationale presumes
that if an invention is in public use, society already has these
benefits.50
of inventions that the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available; (2) favoring the prompt
and widespread disclosure of inventions . . . and (4) prohibiting the inventor from commercially
exploiting the invention for a period greater than the statutorily prescribed time.”). The one-year, builtin grace period balances these policies with the policy of allowing an inventor time to perfect his
invention and prepare a patent application. See id. (“[One of] the policies underlying section 102(b)
[is] . . . allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales activity to determine the
potential economic value of a patent.”). These important policies underlie not only the public use
statutory bar but also the “on sale” statutory bar and other aspects of the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64–66 (1998) (discussing patent policies
of § 102 as a whole and applying the § 102(b) “on sale” bar to further those policies).
45. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23 (1829) (“If the public were already in possession and
common use of an invention . . . there might be sound reason for presuming, that the legislature did not
intend to grant an exclusive right to any one [sic],” given the absence of a “quid pro quo.”); J.E.M. Ag
Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)) (“The disclosure [of a new invention] required by the patent act is ‘the quid
pro quo of the right to exclude.’”); supra note 12.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). “[T]he Patent Act also declares that ‘patents shall have the
attributes of personal property,’ § 261, including ‘the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention,’ § 154(a)(1).” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 392 (2006).
47. Cf. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 142 (quoting Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484) (“The disclosure [of a new
invention] required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’”). Although the
inventor has the exclusive right to “use” the invention, the purchase of a patented device includes an
implied right to “use” the invention embodied in the device. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S.
241, 249 (1942).
48. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (quoting United States
v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933)) (“[U]pon expiration of that period, the
knowledge of the invention inures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it
and profit by its use.”).
49. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503,
518 (2009).
50. See id. This assumption is not always true. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 n.13 (“An invention may
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Second, the channeling rationale forces inventors to choose either
secrecy (i.e. trade secret protection) or disclosure (i.e. patent
protection).51 This prevents inventors from effectively extending the
duration of the statutorily granted monopoly right and increases the
rate at which technology develops.52 Without the public use bar, an
inventor or others could use the invention in public for many years
and then, as soon as competition arrives, apply for patent protection.
This practice extends the effective length of the patent term because
the patent term ends years later than it would have ended had the
inventor applied for the patent as soon as the invention was
completed.
The third rationale underlying the public use statutory bar is to
encourage prompt disclosure of new technology. 53 Through early
disclosure of new technology, persons skilled in the same field access
and learn the new technology sooner, which allows researchers and
inventors in that field of art to improve their work and innovate
faster. 54 The rate of innovation increases notwithstanding the
inventor’s exclusive right to make and use the invention because
be placed ‘in public use or on sale’ within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) without losing its secret
character.” (citing Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971))); Metallizing
Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946)); see also Roin, supra
note 49, at 517.
51. Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520 (“[The inventor] must content himself with either secrecy, or [a
patent].”).
52. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829) (“If an inventor should be permitted to hold back
from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he should, for a long period of years,
retain the monopoly, and make and sell his invention publicly; and thus gather the whole profits of it,
relying upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure; and then, and then only, when the danger
of competition should force him to procure the exclusive right, . . . it would materially retard the
progress of science and the useful arts; and give a premium to those who should be least prompt to
communicate their discoveries.”). See also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998)
(“[Section] 102 . . . serves as a limiting provision, . . . confining the duration of the monopoly to the
statutory term.” (citing Frantz Mfg. Co. v. Phenix Mfg. Co., 457 F.2d 314, 320 (7th Cir. 1972)));
Metallizing, 153 F. 2d at 520.
53. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Section
102(b) . . . is primarily concerned with the policy that encourages an inventor to enter the patent system
promptly, while recognizing a one year period of public knowledge or use or commercial exploitation
before the patent application must be filed.”). The written description component of the patent
application discloses the invention and new information underlying the claimed invention to society. See
supra note 34.
54. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 496–97 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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other inventors can utilize the information contained in the patent
application to improve the invention or develop related products or
processes. 55 The rate of innovation also increases because other
inventors can practice the patented invention with the patent holder’s
permission.56 In addition, prompt disclosure of the claimed invention
allows general society to use the invention sooner because the patent
term expires sooner.57
Lastly, the public use statutory bar reflects a concern about
detrimental public reliance on a claimed invention.58 Section 102(b)
prevents an inventor from inducing the public to rely on a new
technology and then later obtain a patent on the new technology.59
Once the patent issues, the invention’s widespread use gives the
limited monopoly on the new technology greater market strength and
allows the inventor to charge higher prices for the patented goods or
services.60 Thus, the public use bar protects society and businesses
from a business-savvy inventor.
The germinal public use case Pennock v. Dialogue exemplifies
several policies underlying the statutory bar.61 In 1811, Pennock and
Sellers completed an invention consisting of an “improvement in the
art of making leather tubes or hose, for conveying air, water, and
55. See id.
56. See Daniel Taskalos, Note, Metallizing Engineering’s Forfeiture Doctrine After the America
Invents Act, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 657, 669 (2013).
57. See Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19 (“[T]he main object was ‘to promote the progress of science and
useful arts;’ and this could be done best, by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and
vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible.”).
58. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2012).
59. Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v. Varian Assocs., No. 93-1421, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1493 at *12
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1994) (“This result furthers the important public policy of discouraging the removal
of inventions from the public domain which members of the public justifiably have come to believe are
freely available.”); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (citing Frantz Mfg. Co. v. Phenix
Mfg. Co., 457 F.2d 314, 320 (7th Cir. 1972)) (“[Section] 102 . . . serves as a limiting
provision, . . . excluding ideas that are in the public domain from patent protection . . . .”)
(“A . . . reluctance to allow an inventor to remove existing knowledge from public use undergirds the
[public use] bar.” (citing Pennock, 27 U.S. at 24)); cf. Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d
1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The ‘printed publication’ provision of § 102(b) ‘was designed to prevent
withdrawal by an inventor . . . of that which was already in the possession of the public.’” (quoting In re
Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981))).
60. See Roin, supra note 49, at 508.
61. See generally Pennock, 27 U.S. 1.
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other fluids.”62 Not until 1818 did they apply for and obtain a patent
on the invention. 63 Between 1811 and 1818, Pennock and Sellers
gave a third party permission to make and sell upwards of 13,000 feet
of hose constructed according to the claimed invention. 64 The
Supreme Court found the patent invalid because the invention was in
the public’s possession and in common use when Pennock and
Sellers applied for the patent.65
The Court noted that, by waiting approximately seven years before
filing for their patent, Pennock and Sellers had delayed the time in
which members of society could freely make, use, and sell the
invention.66 According to the Court, filing immediately for a patent
(prompt disclosure) was the best way “to promote the progress of
science and useful arts.” 67 In addition, the Court adopted the
channeling rationale when it explained that “it would materially
retard the progress of science and the useful arts” if courts permitted
an inventor to keep his invention a secret for many years and only
apply for a patent once competition appeared. 68 Finally, the Court
explained that once an inventor puts an invention into public use, he
cannot later remove that knowledge from the public. 69 Thus, the
Court protected members of the public who had come to rely on
unrestricted use of that knowledge.70

62. Id. at 14.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 14–15, 23. The Court relied on Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793, which granted “letters
patent” “when any person or persons . . . invented any new or useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereon], not known or used before the
application.” Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. The Court interpreted this statute to mean
that the claimed invention must be “not known or used by the public, before the [patent] application.”
Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19.
66. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19.
67. Id. at 16 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
68. Id. at 19.
69. Id. at 24 (“His voluntary act or acquiescence in the public sale and use is an abandonment of his
right . . . .”); see Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (explaining that Pennock prohibits an
inventor from “remov[ing] existing knowledge from public use.”).
70. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65 (“The patent laws . . . [seek] to protect the public’s right to retain
knowledge already in the public domain . . . .”).
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C. Defining Public Use Before the AIA
Congress explicitly incorporated the public use restriction into the
patent statutes in 1836.71 Over time, courts have interpreted the term
“public use” extremely broadly, straining the term’s plain meaning.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that “public
use includes any use of the claimed invention by a person other than
the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of
secrecy to the inventor.” 72 Similarly, patent law scholar Donald
Chisum defines the term to include “use of the product or process ‘in
its natural and intended way’—even if the invention may in fact be
hidden from public view with such use.”73
First addressing the “known or used” statutory bar in Pennock, the
Supreme Court ruled that the knowledge or use must be by persons

71. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117; 2-6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS
§ 6.02(1)(b) (2014). Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793 required that an invention for which a patent
was sought be “not known or used before the application.” Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318.
See generally Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir.
1946) (describing the development of the public use statutory bar); Michael F. Martin, The End of the
First-to-Invent Rule: A Concise History of its Origin, 49 IDEA 435 (2009) (describing the enactment of
the 1790 patent act and the development of the first-to-invent rule of priority). Interpreting this statute in
Pennock, the Supreme Court ruled that “known or used” must mean known or used by persons other
than the inventor and his employees, including such knowledge or use as would result from commercial
exploitation. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19; see 2-6 CHISUM, supra at § 6.02(1)(a).
In 1897, Congress enacted the long-standing pre-AIA form of the statutory bar. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch.
391, § 1, 29 Stat. 692 (granting a patent to any person who invented a new and useful product or process
“not patented or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his invention
or discovery thereof, or more than two years prior to his application, and not in public use or on sale in
this country for more than two years prior to his application”); 2-6 CHISUM, supra note 71, at § 6.02(1).
In 1939, Congress amended the statutory bar provision by shortening the period from two years to one
year. Act of Aug. 5, 1939 ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212; 2-6 CHISUM, supra note 71, at §6.02(1)(d). As of
March 15, 2013, before the final provisions of the AIA took effect, the patent laws required that an
invention not be “known or used by others” before the date of invention, and not be “in public use”
more than one year before the application date. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
72. Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Netscape
Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis in original)). This definition applies regardless of whether the patentdefeating use is with or without the first inventor’s consent. See, e.g., Elec. Storage Battery Co. v.
Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 17–20 (1939) (applying § 102(b) public use bar when a third party company
independently invented and practiced the patented technology in its factory without placing its
employees under a confidentiality agreement).
73. 2-6 CHISUM, supra note 71, at § 6.02(5)(a) & n.146.
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other than the inventor and his employees.74 A half-century later in
Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 75 addressing what sort of
conduct may forge the bar to patentability, the Court stated, “a single
instance . . . of use by the patentee may, under the circumstances, be
fatal to the patent.” 76 Exactly what those “circumstances” were,
however, was unclear until the seminal case of Egbert v. Lippmann.77
The facts in Egbert are as follows: sometime between January and
May of 1855, Ms. Egbert and a friend complained of the breaking of
their corset steels.78 Mr. Barnes, “an intimate friend” of Ms. Egbert,
offered to make a pair that would not break and presented his new
design at their next rendezvous. 79 Ms. Egbert used the redesigned
steels for many years, placing them in new corsets as the old wore
out.80 In 1863, now married to one another, Mr. Barnes had his wife
cut open a corset and display the steels to another person, Mr.
Sturgis. 81 Three years later Mr. Barnes obtained a patent on his
design. 82 Even though the corset steels were concealed within the
corset, a very private device itself, over the dissent of Justice
Miller,83 the Court held that Ms. Egbert’s use was a public use within
74. See supra note 71.
75. Consol. Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 94 (1876).
76. Id. at 94. Mason completed the invention, an improved fruit jar and cover, in 1859 and applied
for a patent in 1868. Id. at 93. In June 1859, Mason had a glassmaker make at least two-dozen jars for
him. Id. He sold some of these in order “to get the money which they yielded, and to test their salability
in the market.” Id. at 94. The Court held the statutory bar applicable; two years of continuous use or sale
was not required. Id. The Court also noted that inventors are “a meritorious class” but must “comply
with the conditions prescribed by law.” Id. at 96.
77. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
78. Id. at 335.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 337.
83. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 338–39 (Miller, J., dissenting). Justice Miller argued in dissent:
A private use with consent, which could lead to no copy or reproduction of the machine,
which taught the nature of the invention to no one but the party to whom such consent
was given, which left the public at large as ignorant of this as it was before the author’s
discovery, was no abandonment to the public, and did not defeat his claim for a patent. If
the little steep [sic] spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used by only one
woman, covered by her outer-clothing, and in a position always withheld from public
observation, is a public use of that piece of steel, I am at a loss to know the line between a
private and a public use.
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the meaning of the statute.84 The Court reasoned that Barnes gave the
steels to Ms. Egbert without any obligation of secrecy or for any
purpose of experiment and she might have exhibited them to any
person she pleased, or might have made other steels of the same kind,
and used or sold them without violation of any condition or
restriction imposed on her by the inventor. 85 The invention was
complete at the time Mr. Barnes gave Ms. Egbert the steels and he
“slept on his rights for eleven years.” 86 The Supreme Court
reinforced this holding two times in as many years following
Egbert.87
Id. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 337. The Court reasoned:
[T]o constitute the public use of [a patent] it is not necessary that more than one of the
patented articles should be publicly used. The use of a great number may tend to
strengthen the proof, but one well-defined case of such use is just as effectual to annul the
patent as many. . . . We remark, secondly, that, whether the use of an invention is public
or private does not necessarily depend upon the number of persons to whom its use is
known. If an inventor, having made his device, gives or sells it to another, to be used by
the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction, or injunction of secrecy, and it is so
used, such use is public, even though the use and knowledge of the use may be confined
to one person. We say, thirdly, that some inventions are by their very character only
capable of being used where they cannot be seen or observed by the public eye. An
invention may consist of a lever or spring, hidden in the running gear of a watch . . . .
Nevertheless, if its inventor sells a machine of which his invention forms a part, and
allows it to be used without restriction of any kind, the use is a public one. So, on the
other hand, a use necessarily open to public view, if made in good faith solely to test the
qualities of the invention, and for the purpose of experiment, is not a public use within
the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 336.
85. Id. at 337.
86. Id.
87. See Manning v. Cape Ann Isinglass & Glue Co., 108 U.S. 462 (1883) (holding patent on a
method of converting fish bladders made of gelatin, isinglass, into thin hard sheets was invalid). The
Court found that a succession of partnerships used substantially the same process more than four years
before the application date. Id. at 464. The public use bar applied because the patent owner’s partners
“were allowed by the inventor the unrestricted use of the [patented method] during the period
mentioned, without injunction of secrecy or other condition.” Id. at 465 (citing Egbert, 104 U.S. at 333).
In the second case, the Court held a patent on an improvement to the doors and casing of safes was
invalid. Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90 (1883). More than two years prior to filing his patent application,
the inventor sold three of the “burglar-proof” safes. Id. at 96. Even though completely concealed within
the safe, the Court found the invention was in public use. Id. at 96.
The construction and arrangement and purpose and mode of operation and use of the
bolts in the safes were necessarily known to the workmen who put them in. They were, it
is true, hidden from view, after the safes were completed, and it required a destruction of
the safe to bring them into view. But this was no concealment of them or use of them in
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Though Egbert is widely followed in the federal courts, 88 the
Federal Circuit has occasionally distinguished similar fact patterns by
implying confidentiality in the absence of an express agreement of
confidentiality. 89 In one such case, Moleculon Research Corp. v.
CBS, Inc., the owner of a patent on a cube puzzle composed of eight
smaller cubelets that could be rotated in groups, sued CBS for
infringement via its Rubik’s Cube puzzle.90 More than a year before
he applied for the patent, the inventor, Larry Nichols, constructed
several paper models of his puzzle, which confirmed the feasibility of
his conception. 91 Nichols showed these puzzles to several friends,
including two roommates and a colleague in the chemistry
department, and explained the puzzle to at least one of them. 92 In
addition, Nichols brought a working wood block prototype of his
puzzle into his office and demonstrated how it worked to
Moleculon’s president, who expressed immediate interest and
suggested that Nichols commercialize the cubed puzzle.93 The court
declined to follow Egbert, instead finding that “Nichols at all times
retained control over the puzzle’s use and the distribution of
information concerning it,” despite the fact that neither Nichols’s

secret. They had no more concealment than was inseparable from any legitimate use of
them.
Id. at 97 (citing Egbert, 104 U.S. at 333). Because the safes seemed clearly to have been “on sale” and
in fact sold, it is not clear why the Court decided to discuss the problems in terms of public use. 2-6
CHISUM, supra note 71, at § 6.02(2)(f).
88. E.g., Manning, 108 U.S. 462; Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
89. See, e.g., Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986); cf. TP Labs.,
Inc., v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In TP Laboratories, the inventor, more
than a year before filing his patent application for an orthodontic device, used the device on three
different patients without obligation of confidentiality or secrecy. TP Labs., Inc., 724 F.2d at 967–68. In
addition, several of the inventor’s associates saw the device before the critical date. Id. at 969. The court
held this pre-filing activity did not constitute a § 102(b) public use because, contrary to the district
court’s findings of fact, the pre-filing uses were experimental. Id. at 972. Moreover, that other
orthodontists saw the device in the patients’ mouths “does not indicate the inventor’s lack of control or
abandonment to the public.” Id. The court reasoned that the public use bar was inapplicable because
“none of the policies which underlie the public use bar and which, in effect, define it have been shown
to be violated.” Id. at 973.
90. Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1263.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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friends nor Moleculon’s president had not entered into any express
confidentiality agreement.94 Thus, the court held the public use bar
did not apply to the invention.95
D. The Public Use Statutory Bar and Secret Commercial Use
In addition to a single use by someone other than the inventor not
obligated to secrecy or confidentiality, courts apply the public use bar
when an inventor uses the invention for commercial purposes more
than a year prior to filing for a patent, even if the use is absolutely
secret. 96 This situation differs greatly from Pennock and Egbert
because, unlike in those cases, only the inventor, or a small number
of people restricted by confidentiality, use or know of the invention.97
In other words, the prior patent-invalidating uses are secret,
completely concealed from the public. Without a doubt, however,
this doctrine furthers the channeling and prompt disclosure rationales
by preventing inventors from secretly using their inventions and
waiting to patent the invention until a subsequent inventor enters the
market.
The secret-commercial-user doctrine took root in a 1946 decision
by the oft-quoted Judge Learned Hand.98 In Metallizing Engineering
Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., Judge Hand ruled that if an
inventor uses his invention for commercial purposes for more than
one year, he “forfeits his right [to a patent] regardless of how little
the public may have learned about the invention.”99 Relying on the
channeling and prompt disclosure rationales expressed in Pennock,
the court invalidated the patent due to the inventor’s secret use of an
94. Id. at 1266.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96 (1883).
97. Compare id., with Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829), and Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S.
333 (1881).
98. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946).
99. Id. at 519–20. This decision overruled Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. Griffin & Sons, holding that the
predominantly commercial character of the inventor’s secret uses would not invalidate his patent, even
though the uses were more than one year before the critical date. Id. at 518; see also Peerless Roll Leaf
Co. v. Griffin & Sons, 29 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1928).
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improved process for conditioning metal for his clients. 100 The
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have since explicitly adopted the
seminal decision by Judge Hand.101
Interestingly, Judge Hand’s decision in Metallizing did not
overrule Gillman v. Stern (also written by Judge Hand), where the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a third party’s prior
secret commercial use of a new machine more than a year before the
critical date did not prevent the inventor of the machine from
patenting the device later. 102 The court ruled that a prior use,
commercial or otherwise, which did not disclose the invention to the
art was not within the statutory bar.103 As with Judge Hand’s first
party secret commercial use cases, the Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit have explicitly adopted this aspect of his decisions as well.104
In doing so, the Federal Circuit noted that “[t]here is no reason or
statutory basis” on which a secret commercial use by an independent
non-applicant more than a year before the critical date could bar a
patent.105

100. See Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520.
101. E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149 (1989) (“As Judge
Learned Hand once put it: ‘[I]t is a condition upon the inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not
exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself with either
secrecy or legal monopoly’”) (quoting Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics
Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Federal Circuit states that “an inventor’s own prior
commercial use, albeit kept secret, may constitute a public use or sale under § 102(b), barring him from
obtaining a patent.” Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
102. Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1940). I want to reiterate the distinction between
secret use and hidden public use. In Egbert, Ms. Egbert’s use of the corset steels was a public use
notwithstanding the hidden nature of the use because she was not under an obligation of secrecy to
Barnes (the inventor). Egbert, 104 U.S. at 337. In contrast, a secret use is one in which only the inventor
(or those under obligation of secrecy or confidentiality) uses or has access to the invention. If Barnes
asked Ms. Egbert to sign a confidentiality agreement before seeing or using the new corset steels, then it
would be a secret use. Whether such a use would be considered “commercial” within the meaning of the
Metallizing forfeiture doctrine is a different question.
103. Gillman, 114 F.2d at 31.
104. E.g., Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Metallizing, 153
F.2d at 516; D.L. Auld Co., 714 F.2d at 1144; W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540
(Fed. Cir. 1983)); D.L. Auld, 714 F.2d at 1147.
105. W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1550.
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E. Introducing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
In 2011, following years of scholarly and congressional debate,
Congress enacted the AIA and comprehensively reformed the
American patent system. 106 The major change was from a first-toinvent (FTI) system to a first-inventor-to-file (FITF) system,
“harmoniz[ing] the United States patent system with the patent
systems commonly used in nearly all other countries throughout the
world with whom the United States conducts trade.”107 The switch to
a FITF system means that the first person to invent a new technology
or improve upon an existing technology no longer holds the exclusive
right to patent his or her invention. Instead, it is a race to file the
patent application. 108 Unlike under the former statutory regime, an
earlier inventor who does not abandon his invention or sleep on his
right to patent will not get a patent on the invention if a subsequent
inventor applies for a patent first.109 In fact, under the AIA, the laterinventor/earlier-filer has the right to exclude the first inventor from
making, using, and selling the technology. 110 Many patent law
scholars criticize this approach because they think it benefits big
companies and hurts small companies and independent inventors.111
106. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284 (2011);
Taskalos, supra note 56 (examining several patent reform proposals leading up to the AIA).
107. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(p), 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The AIA
essentially established a first-inventor-to-publish system rather than a first-inventor-to-file system
because of the one-year grace period. See discussion infra note 117 (explaining the effect of the grace
period under the AIA).
108. See id. (establishing a race to publish the subject matter of the invention).
109. See Taskalos, supra note 56 at 679–700.
110. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (granting a patent-holder the right to exclude others from making,
using, and selling the patented technology in the United States). But see 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012)
(creating a limited defense for inventors who commercially used the patented technology at least one
year before the effective filing date or date on which the claimed invention was disclosed publicly);
Martin Gomez, Note, Manufacturing, Please Come Home: How AIA’s Prior User Right Could Be The
American Economy’s Savior, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 61, 74–78 (2012).
111. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, The Need for Speed (and Grace): Issues in a First-Inventor-to-File
World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1035, 1041 (2008) (arguing that a move by the United States to a first
to file system will likely have negative ramifications for small entity inventors); Ned L. Conley, Firstto-Invent: A Superior System for the United States, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 779, 782 (1991). But see Mark
A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
1299, 1320–21 (2003) (arguing that the U.S. first to invent system is not helping small entity inventors).
See generally Dennis D. Crouch, Is Novelty Obsolete? Chronicling the Irrelevance of the Invention Date
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The AIA also introduced three important changes to the scope and
content of the prior art in U.S. patent law.112 First, the AIA amended
the statutory language that defines the events that qualify as prior art.
The text of the new patent statute provides:
Conditions for patentability [and] novelty
(a) Novelty; Prior Art.—A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless—
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available
to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention.113
The new statute removes the old § 102(a) “previously known or
used by others” category of prior art and adds a new catch-all
provision with the “or otherwise available to the public” language.114
Second, the AIA removes the old, one-year, automatic grace
period.115 The AIA’s new grace period only covers disclosures by the
inventor made within a year of the effective application date116 or
disclosures by anyone else occurring after the inventor publicly
disclosed the invention but within a year of the effective application
date.117 Last, the AIA removed the geographic restrictions previously
in U.S. Patent Law, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 53, 59 n.20 (collecting sources on the
advantages and disadvantages of adopting a first-to-file system).
112. Gomez, supra note 110. The AIA also made several other changes not described in this article.
For example, the AIA added a post-grant review option to quickly weed out mistake patents. 35 U.S.C.
§ 321 (2012). The post-grant review allows anyone to challenge the validity of a patent based on §§ 101,
102, 103, and 112. Id. at § 321(b). A challenger must file within nine months of the issuance of the
patent. Id. at § 321(c).
113. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (emphasis added).
114. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
115. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
116. Id. The effective application date or effective filing date found in § 102(a) is the earliest date of
the following: (1) the actual filing date of the patent per § 100(i)(1); (2) the filing date of the first foreign
application to which a later U.S. application establishes priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119; (3) the filing
date of the first U.S. application to which a later U.S. continuation application establishes priority under
35 U.S.C. § 120; or (4) the filing date of the first U.S. application to which a later U.S. continuation
application establishes priority under 35 U.S.C. § 121. Id. A single patent application may have multiple
claims with different effective filing dates based on when a sufficient disclosure was made. Id.
117. Id. § 102(b)(1). Under the AIA, it is ambiguous whether a third party patent application filed,
which claims the same invention in a previous public disclosure by the later patent applicant, qualifies
as prior art. Id. The majority believes that the AIA’s grace period means that the AIA really is a first-
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placed on the public use and “on sale” statutory bars.118 Under the
AIA, if the invention is “in public use, on sale, or otherwise available
to the public” anywhere in the world, the invention is not
patentable.119
How courts will interpret this new prior art definition “in public
use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public” is unclear.120 Many
scholars argue that retention of the terms “public use” and “on sale”
indicate a congressional desire to adopt the previous judicial
interpretation of those terms.121 However, the textual amendments to
§ 102(b) prior art inject a “publicness” requirement into patentinvalidating prior art events under the AIA.122 Retaining the judicial
interpretation of public use would render the phrase “otherwise
available to the public” superfluous and maintain the internationally
disharmonious patentability standard, which is contrary to the spirit
of the patent reform. Further, and more importantly, with the removal
of geographic restrictions and removal of the automatic grace period,
it is critical that hidden third party activity not create bars to U.S.
patentability. Such a burden would create a wildly unpredictable
patent system, and inventors and investors may lose faith in
American patent protection.

inventor-to-disclose system and a subsequently filed patent application does not bar the person who first
disclosed the invention from claiming it in his own later-filed patent application.
118. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (2012).
119. Id.
120. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
121. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 139–138 and accompanying text.
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II. DEFINING PUBLIC USE IN A POST-AIA WORLD
A. Statutory Interpretation Reveals that Public Use No Longer
Includes Hidden, Inaccessible, Private Use
1. The Text of AIA § 102(a)(1)
When interpreting a statute, the natural staring point is the text.123
If the meaning is plain and unambiguous, courts apply the statute
according to its terms.124 For primarily two reasons, the text of AIA
§ 102(a)(1) plainly indicates that prior art no longer includes hidden,
inaccessible, private uses of technology,125 even if the use takes place
before a disclosure by the inventor or more than a year before the
effective application date. First, this category of prior art is called
public use. Public means “exposed to general view” or “accessible to
or shared by all members of the community.”126 One cannot seriously
contend that the pre-AIA definition for public use—a single use by
anyone under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy—fits
within the plain meaning of the term “public use.”127 For example, a
drill bit is not “exposed to general view” or “accessible to or shared
123. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009) (“[Under the] settled principles of statutory
construction . . . we must first determine whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous.”) (citing
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997)); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)
(“It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in
which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to
its terms.”).
124. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 387.
125. See infra Part I.D. The meaning of the terms “hidden” and “inaccessible” are developed in Part
0I.D. The terms essentially mean that a person of ordinary skill in the field of art could not locate the
reference with reasonable diligence. Infra Part I.D.; MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
925 (11th ed. 2003), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/private. The term “private” means
non-public, in the sense that the action or event did not take place at a public forum (e.g. the event
occurred in a laboratory or an apartment). Id.
126. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1005 (11th ed. 2003), http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/public.
127. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 339 (1881) (Miller, J., dissenting) (“I cannot on such
reasoning as this eliminate from the statute the word public, and disregard its obvious importance in
connection with the remainder of the act, for the purpose of defeating a patent otherwise meritorious.”);
Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 54–55 (arguing that it would be “truly absurd” to interpret § 102(a)(1) public use to
include non-public uses).
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by all members of the community” when it is used by one
construction worker underground next to a highway.128 But that is the
result under the pre-AIA definition of public use.129 Thirteen months
before David Cox applied for his patent on that drill bit—merely one
month before the critical date—one person other than Cox knew
about the drill bit and tested it for Cox at a commercial site, hundreds
of feet beneath the earth’s surface.130 The fact that others could have
known about or discovered that use of the drill bit does not mean that
others did have access to it.131 The statutory term is not “use that
could have become public” but rather actually was “in public use.”132
Second, the terms “public use,” “on sale,” and “otherwise available
to the public” are linked together with “or.”133 When the term “or
otherwise” appears at the end of a string of clauses, the term restricts
the meaning of the preceding terms.134 Thus, the catchall phrase “or
otherwise available to the public” gives meaning to the term “public
use.”135 In effect, the AIA provides that if an invention is not publicly
used it may still qualify as prior art—and destroy novelty—if it is
available to the public in a different way. The key is that, to qualify
as prior art, the AIA requires that an event or action is available to
the public, through use or otherwise.136 A single use of technology in
private by someone other than the patentee cannot qualify as being
“available to the public” and, accordingly, the plain meaning of

128. Cf. New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Dyk, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1299.
130. Id. at 1293.
131. Id. at 1300.
132. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
133. Id.
134. See Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138, 146–47 (2d Cir. 1999). In construing the
term “may include . . . back pay, . . . or any other equitable relief,” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)
(emphasis in original)) the court concluded that “the use of the words ‘other’ immediately after the
reference to back pay and before ‘equitable relief’ demonstrated Congress’ understanding that the back
pay remedy is equitable in nature.” Id.
135. 157 CONG. REC. S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011). In open session before the Senate, Senator Jon
Kyl explained that this was the proper construction of AIA § 102(a)(1). 157 CONG. REC. S1370 (daily
ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing Strom, 202 F.3d at 146–47). Id. (citing Strom, 202 F.3d at 146–47).
136. 157 CONG. REC. S1366 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011).
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public use in the AIA cannot include such a remote, hidden,
inaccessible use.137
Many patent attorneys and patent law associations agree with this
interpretation of the AIA. 138 For example, the Intellectual Property
Law section of the American Bar Association writes:
[T]he passage “otherwise available to the public” reflects the
touchstone of what constitutes prior art under the AIA under
section 102(a)(1). This section requires availability to the public
or public accessibility is an overarching requirement. Such
accessibility is critical to provide a simpler, more predictable and
fully transparent patent system. As such, for a “public
use” . . . .the statutory requirements under the AIA require a
public disclosure. Thus . . . [non-public uses] would not qualify
139
as prior art under the AIA.

The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) also
agrees.140 The AIPLA describes the AIA’s addition of the “otherwise
available to the public” clause as “a major policy change achieved by
the new legislation, which . . . further[s] the goal of increasing
objectivity in the identification of prior art.”141
Although it is clear that the AIA’s definition of public use does not
include hidden, inaccessible, private uses, many argue that the text of

137. See Armitage, supra note 127, at 53–55.
138. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the AIA § 102(a)(1) has an “overarching requirement for public
availability in order . . . to constitute prior art” and that it would be “truly absurd” to interpret
§ 102(a)(1) public use to include non-public uses); Dennis Crouch, Did the AIA Eliminate Secret Prior
Art?, PATENTLYO (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/did-the-aia-eliminatesecret-prior-art.html (describing views of patent attorneys and patent scholars on the meaning of
§ 102(a)(1), including the Intellectual Property Owners Association and the American Bar Association’s
IP Law Section). But see Mark Lemley, Comments on PTO 1st to File Guidelines, USPTO (July 26,
2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/m-lemley_20121005.pdf (rejecting the
USPTO’s interpretation of the AIA).
139. Joseph M. Potenza, ABA-IPL Comments on First Inventor to File Provisions (Oct. 11, 2012),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/aba-ipl_20121001.pdf.
140. See, e.g, William G. Barber, First Inventor to File Proposed Rules and Examination Guidelines
(Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/aipla_20121005.pdf.
141. Id. at 8.
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§ 102(a)(1) is ambiguous and advance their argument with various
canons of statutory construction. Such an exercise is fruitless
because, as Judge Richard Posner pointed out years ago, “for every
canon one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and
opposite canon.”142 Indeed, in this instance, there are several canons
favoring a new definition of public use in the AIA and several canons
supporting retention of the old definition of public use.
Scholars in favor of retaining the previous, overly broad definition
of public use argue that the retention of the same pre-AIA language
suggests that Congress intended the previous interpretation of those
terms to be continued. 143 This canon, however, rests on the false
premise that a majority of legislators who voted on the reenactment
actually knew of the courts’ interpretation of public use.144 It is more
likely that only a small number of patent law specialists knew the
courts’ broad definition,145 and thus this canon is unpersuasive.
Others argue that Congress did not intend to change the definition
of public use because Congress does not “‘hide elephants in
mouseholes.’”146 They argue that changing the definition of public
use would be a dramatic shift in U.S. patent law and that adding one
clause to the list of prior art categories cannot have been designed to
make such a dramatic change.147 This argument is also unpersuasive
for two reasons. First, a new definition of public use is not a dramatic
shift in patent law, so there is no “elephant” hiding in the
142. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 276 (1985).
143. See, e.g., HAROLD C. WEGNER, THE 2011 PATENT LAW 110–12 (2d ed. 2011) (citing Professors
Robert P. Merges and John F. Duffy in a September 16, 2011, PowerPoint).
144. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800, 813–14 (1983).
145. See id. (arguing that only a small number of specialists in Congress know about judicial
interpretations and desire to freeze the existing judicial construction into statutory form).
146. WEGNER, supra note 143 at 111–12 (citing Professors Robert P. Merges and John F. Duffy in a
September 16, 2011, PowerPoint) (explaining that the court felt confident that the AIA did not
“overrule[] Metallizing Engineering so that the inventor’s own secret commercial exploitation . . . will
not bar that inventor from later seeking a patent [because] . . . Congress does not ‘hide elephants in
mouseholes.’ Overturning two centuries of consistent law would be a big elephant to hide in a
colloquy.”) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have
held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”)).
147. Cf. WEGNER, supra note 143.
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“mousehole.” 148 Second, Congress could have unambiguously
created a third catchall category and retained the old definition of
public use, but it did not. For example, Congress could have simply
not included the term “otherwise” in the last clause or the last clause
could have been “or available to the public in any form.”149
Lastly, critics of a newer, more common-sense meaning of public
use argue that using a catchall phrase appearing at the end of a list to
narrow the definition of the preceding terms violates the ejusdem
generis canon of construction.150 According to the canon, the term
“otherwise available to the public” is not intended to narrow the
meaning of public use but is a catchall phrase whose breadth is
narrowed by the preceding terms “public use” and “on sale.” 151 This
argument lacks merit because the ejusdem generis canon does not
apply to § 102(a)(1): the list is too short, and the “otherwise available
to the public” term is not vague.152 Moreover, applying that principle
in this setting violates the canon to avoid surplusage, which states
that a statute should not be interpreted in a way that renders a term
superfluous.153 If “otherwise available to the public” is constrained to
148. WEGNER, supra note 143 (citing Professors Merges and Duffy). The “elephant” change in U.S.
patent law to which these critics refer is the abrogation of the Metallizing doctrine. Id. However, that
conclusion does not follow from the fact that the AIA adopted a new definition; that the AIA ushered in
a new public availability requirement to public use does not mean that Congress overruled Metallizing.
See infra Part II.A. (arguing that, despite a change in the scope of public use, the AIA did not overrule
Metallizing); Taskalos, supra note 56 at 657 (arguing that the AIA did not overrule Metallizing).
149. However, it would be disingenuous to imply that Congress could not also have unambiguously
removed hidden, inaccessible, private use from the prior art. That the AIA is ambiguous on this point
may also suggest that Congress did not intend to do so. For example, Congress could have written “or
otherwise available to the public” as “provided that the invention is made available to the public” or
“unless the invention is not publicly disclosed.” In addition, Congress could have “inserted ‘non-secret’
before ‘ . . . public use, on sale . . . .’” Paul Morgan, The Ambiguity in Section 102(a)(1) of the LeahySmith America Invents Act, 2011 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 29, 33 (2011).
150. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior Art Problems with the New Patent Act, 2011
PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 12, 25–26 (2011). This canon of construction states that where “general words
follow the enumeration of particular classes or persons or things, the general words shall be construed as
applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or kind as there enumerated.” Walling v.
Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., 49 F. Supp. 846, 859 (W.D. La. 1943).
151. See Sarnoff, supra note 150.
152. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
153. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010) (citing Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303
(2009)) (interpreting § 273 such that business methods are never patentable “would violate the canon
against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would render another provision
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a category including public use and “on sale” events, there are no
actions or events that would qualify as prior art under the “otherwise
available to the public” category that would not also fall under the
pre-AIA public use or “on sale” categories.
2. The Spirit of the AIA
Even if the text of AIA § 102(a)(1) is ambiguous, the spirit of the
2011 comprehensive patent reform reveals that public use no longer
includes hidden, secret uses of an invention. When courts find the
text of a statute is ambiguous or vague, they look to the purpose or
“spirit” of the legislation. 154 The spirit of the AIA reinforces the
interpretation that public use does not include hidden, inaccessible
uses of an invention because adopting the old definition would
contradict two of its primary goals: international harmonization and
increased efficiency. 155 The flagship reform of the AIA was the
switch from a FTI system to a FITF system.156 The switch was made
in an effort to increase efficiency and harmonize the US patent laws
with the patent laws in the rest of the world.157 Employing a new
public use definition under the AIA would further this policy because
Europe and other major foreign countries—such as Japan—limit
prior art to events that make an invention available to the public.158

superfluous.”).
154. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458–59 (1892) (straining the
meaning of “labor or service of any kind” for “any person under contract” to exclude pastors and
religious employees in favor of the “spirit” of the legislation). In fact, even if a court finds that the plain
meaning of § 102(a)(1) adopted the old definition of public use, the court should ignore that plain
meaning and follow the spirit of the AIA.
155. See discussion supra Part I.E.
156. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(p), 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
157. See discussion supra Part I.E.
158. European Patent Convention art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legaltexts/html/epc/2013/e/index.html (defining prior art as “compris[ing] everything made available to the
public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way” without geographic
restriction); Japanese Patent Act art. 29(1)(i) (creating a bar to patentability where the invention was
“publicly known in Japan or a foreign country”); Morgan, supra note 149, at 30 (arguing that excluding
secret prior art would further the AIA’s purpose of international harmonization). See also WEGNER,
supra note 143, at 106.
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In addition, the AIA eliminated several categories of secret prior
art, such as the § 102(g) secret invention by another inventor and the
§ 102(f) prior knowledge transferred from another to the patent
applicant categories. The removal of secret prior art leads to clearer
notice for anyone interested in researching the state of the art159 and,
in turn, increases overall efficiency by decreasing the volume of
patent litigation.160 Likewise, courts should interpret § 102(a)(1) in a
manner that eliminates secret prior art in an effort increase notice and
efficiency.
3. The Legislative History of the AIA
If the text is unconvincing and the spirit of the AIA does not
persuade courts to eliminate hidden, inaccessible, private use from
the public use prior art category, the legislative history behind the
AIA forcefully supports the argument. 161 Prior to the Senate vote,
Senator Jon Kyl explained that the “[n]ew section
102(a)(1) . . . limits all non-patent prior art to that which is available
to the public.” 162 Senator Kyl explains that Congress’s Judiciary
Committee added the words “otherwise available to the public” to
159.
160.
161.
162.

See generally Crouch, supra note 138.
Most patent infringement suits do not involve willful infringement.
See Taskalos, supra note 5656, at 686–87.
157 CONG. REC. S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (emphasis added). The Senator stated that:
Another aspect of the bill’s changes to current section 102 also merits special mention.
New section 102(a)(1) makes two important changes to the definition of non-patent prior
art. First, it lifts current law’s geographic limits on what uses, knowledge, or sales
constitute prior art. And second, it limits all non-patent prior art to that which is available
to the public. This latter change is clearly identified in Senate Report 110–259, the report
for S. 1145, the predecessor to this bill in the 110th Congress. The words “otherwise
available to the public” were added to section 102(a)(1) during that Congress’s Judiciary
Committee mark up of the bill. The word “otherwise” makes clear that the preceding
clauses describe things that are of the same quality or nature as the final clause—that is,
although different categories of prior art are listed, all of them are limited to that which
makes the invention “available to the public.” As the committee report notes at page 9,
“the phrase ‘available to the public’ is added to clarify the broad scope of relevant prior
art, as well as to emphasize the fact that it [i.e., the relevant prior art] must be publicly
available.” In other words, as the report notes, “[p]rior art will be measured from the
filing date of the application and will include all art that publicly exists prior to the filing
date, other than disclosures by the inventor within one year of filing.”

Id.
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make clear that all of the relevant prior art “must be available to the
public.” 163 Calling the current statutory bar doctrines “traps for
unwary inventors [that] impose extreme results to no real
purpose,” 164 the Senator explains that the present definition
“abrogates the rule announced in Egbert v. Lippmann,” which held
that the public use bar does not depend on the number of persons
with knowledge of the use and that a single use may erect it.165
In addition, during another Senate colloquy, Senator Leahy–the
primary sponsor and author of the Senate bill—responded to
questions about the meaning of § 102(a). He stated that:
[S]ubsection 102(a) was drafted in part to do away with
163. Id. (citing S. REP NO. 110–259 (2008)). Professor Sarnoff argues that the term “otherwise
available to the public” only modifies the first two categories in § 102(a)(1) (patented and described in a
printed publication), not “on-sale” and “public use.” Sarnoff, supra note 150 at 26. To support this
conclusion, he argues that:
The “otherwise available to the public” language derives from House bills in earlier
Congresses. In those bills, the “on sale” and “in public use” categories had been
eliminated in favor of a broad catchall category “otherwise publicly known,” which again
suggested that [only] the first two categories (patented or described in a printed
publication) also had to be publicly known. . . . This legislative language (including the
definition) would have precluded most “secret prior art,” as pre-filing prior art was
restricted to third-party sales or uses of the invention and as the earlier bills provided a
one-year grace period for the inventor’s own acts. After significant off-the-record
legislative negotiations, the existing “on-sale” and “public use” statutory categories were
restored, and the “otherwise publicly known” language was converted to the “otherwise
available to the public” language.
Id. at 26 (citing H.R. 2795, 109th Cong., § 3(b) (2005) (proposed §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(b)(3)(A) &
(B))).
Harold C. Wegner also views the AIA’s revision history differently than Senator Kyl. Arguing in favor
of retaining the pre-AIA definition of public use, he writes that:
Perhaps [the] best argument [is] that the 2005 and succeeding versions of patent reform
legislation until 2011 had included language that would have overruled Metallizing
Engineering and that this language was consciously put into the earlier legislation for this
purpose. . . . [A]lso . . . these changes were removed and replaced in the new law with the
old “public use” language and without language disqualifying a secret commercialization.
WEGNER, supra note 143, at 111 (emphasis in original).
164. 157 CONG. REC. S1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing as an example of such a result
Beachcombers Int’l, Inc. v. Wildewood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
See infra text accompanying notes 194–198.
165. 157 CONG. REC. S1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 336
(1881)). Senator Kyl explains that in the AIA’s “revisions to section 102, vindication has finally come to
Justice Miller, albeit 130 years late” and cites to Justice Miller’s dissent in Egbert. Id. (citing Egbert,
104 U.S. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting)). See also supra note 83.
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precedent under current law that . . . private uses or secret
processes practiced in the United States that result in a product
or service that is then made public may be deemed patentdefeating prior art. . . . In effect, the new paragraph 102(a)(1)
imposes an overarching requirement for availability to the
public, that is a public disclosure, which will limit paragraph
102(a)(1) prior art to subject matter meeting the public
166
accessibility standard that is well-settled in current law . . . .”

166. 157 CONG. REC. S1496–97 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011). The senate colloquy is the following:
Mr. LEAHY: Mr. President, Congress has been working on the America Invents Act
going back many years. It has gone through numerous iterations and changes have been
made over time. Accordingly, I want to take a few minutes to discuss some important
legislative history of a critical piece of this bill—section 2 of the legislation, which
amends section 102 of title 35 of the United States Code. There has been a great deal of
attention paid to subsections 102(a) and (b) and how those two subsections will work
together. Senator BENNET and others have asked about this issue in particular.
Mr. HATCH: I thank the Senator. I agree with the chairman that it is important that we
set down a definitive legislative history of those subsections, which will be important for
each and every patent application.
Mr. LEAHY: One key issue on which people have asked for clarification is the interplay
between patent-defeating disclosures under subsection 102(a) and the situations where
those disclosures are excepted and have no patent-defeating effect under the grace period
provided in subsection 102(b).
In particular, some in the small inventor community have been concerned that a
disclosure by an inventor might qualify as patent-defeating prior art under subsection
102(a) because, for example, the inventor’s public disclosure and by a “public disclosure”
I mean one that results in the claimed invention being “described in a printed publication,
or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public”—might in some situation
not be excluded as prior art under section 102(b)’s grace period. There is absolutely no
situation in which this could happen given the interplay between subsections 102(a) and
102(b) as these subsections are drafted.
We intend that if an inventor’s actions are such as to constitute prior art under
subsection 102(a), then those actions necessarily trigger subsection 102(b)’s protections
for the inventor and, what would otherwise have been section 102(a) prior art, would be
excluded as prior art by the grace period provided by subsection 102(b). Indeed, as an
example of this, subsection 102(b)(1)(A), as written, was deliberately couched in broader
terms than subsection 102(a)(1). This means that any disclosure by the inventor
whatsoever, whether or not in a form that resulted in the disclosure being available to the
public, is wholly disregarded as prior art. A simple way of looking at new subsection
102(a) is that no aspect of the protections under current law for inventors who disclose
their inventions before filing is in any way changed.
Mr. HATCH: [Response omitted.]
Mr. LEAHY: . . . One of the implications of the point we are making is that subsection
102(a) was drafted in part to do away with precedent under current law that private offers
for sale or private uses or secret processes practiced in the United States that result in a
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Thus, the legislative history evinces Congressional intent to
remove hidden, inaccessible, non-public uses from the realm of
patent-defeating prior art.
B. Hidden, Inaccessible, Private Use Creates a Different Kind of
Problem
All other arguments aside, it is critical that courts interpret public
use such that it does not include hidden, inaccessible, private use to
avoid a potentially disastrous problem. The patent cases that receive
most of the attention are the cases mentioned above in Part II.A.
Pennock,167 Egbert, 168 and Metallizing. 169 Those cases focus on the
harmful conduct of the patentee, punishing or taking away the
patentee’s right to receive patent protection for his or her invention.
But the judicial interpretation of the public use statutory bar created
an important problem: scrupulous inventors are blindsided by public
use prior art that they did not know about and could not have known
about. Although this problem is currently small in magnitude, it will
grow much bigger in the next five or ten years due to the changes170
in the AIA.
If not prevented, the expansion of the problem of hidden,
inaccessible, private prior art will cripple the US patent system. That
conclusion may seem dramatic and exaggerated, but if patent
practitioners and technology investors lose faith in the U.S. patent
product or service that is then made public may be deemed patent-defeating prior art.
That will no longer be the case. In effect, the new paragraph 102(a)(1) imposes an
overarching requirement for availability to the public, that is a public disclosure, which
will limit paragraph 102(a)(1) prior art to subject matter meeting the public accessibility
standard . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
Harold C. Wegner describes this colloquy as “faux” “post-vote” legislative history and argues that the
discussion took place the day after the AIA vote. See WEGNER, supra note 143, at 125–28. While a postvote explanation of the bill’s terms is certainly less persuasive than pre-vote Congressional debate, it
clarifies the writer’s intentions and views of the clause’s meaning. In fact, Senator Leahy prefaces his
comments by noting that other senators asked for clarification of subsection 102(a).
167. 27 U.S. 1 (1829).
168. 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
169. 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 112–122 (describing the changes made by the AIA).
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system’s ability to reward, they will discontinue seeking patent
protection. In other words, hidden, inaccessible, private prior art may
invalidate so many valuable patents that inventors and investors no
longer seek patent protection because the risk of invalidity is so
high.171 An infringement suit will be like digging one’s own grave
because the defendant will seek out one person, anywhere in the
world, who used the invention at least once outside of an obligation
of secrecy. If the patent system is unpredictable due to high findings
of invalidity, society will stop seeking patent protection. Instead,
some inventors will keep their work secret and rely on trade secret
protection. Other inventors will simply not invent because investors
will not finance their innovations. Any combination of these two
results will stifle innovation. A large percentage of inventions will
never be made because they are ineligible for trade secret protection
due to the problem of reverse engineering and independent
creation.172 Even in the fields of art for which trade secret protection
is effective, innovation will be stifled because the underlying

171. The important metric here deals only with valuable patents. If the patent is not valuable, its
validity is usually irrelevant because the patent-holder or exclusive licensee cannot profit from the
patent. Litigation is a good barometer of a patent’s value. Without empirical evidence, it is impossible to
know what percentage of USPTO-issued, valuable patents found invalid by courts would cause
inventors and investors to lose faith in the U.S. patent system’s ability to reward inventors. It is fair to
assume that if courts found ninety-five percent of valuable patents invalid it would stifle innovation.
Likewise, it is fair to assume that if courts only found five percent of valuable patents invalid it would
not stifle innovation. The decision to invent or not will also include many other factors, such as the field
of art, the crowdedness of the type of invention, and the amount of the investment needed to develop a
commercial product or implement a new process. Some fields of art, such as pharmaceuticals, are more
predictable because they offer better notice and define boundaries better than other fields of art. BESSEN
& MEURER, infra note 214. However, the breadth of the public use prior art category will affect the
predictability of patent validity of pharmaceutical patents, at least to some extent. See, e.g., Dey, L.P. v.
Sunovion Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that a clinical trial of a drug may
have constituted public use under § 102(b) and remanding for factual findings).
172. See Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 489–90 (1974). As the Court explained:
Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law.
While trade secret law does not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest
means, e.g., independent creation or reverse engineering, patent law operates “against the
world,” forbidding any use of the invention for whatever purpose for a significant length
of time. The holder of a trade secret also takes a substantial risk that the secret will be
passed on to his competitors, by theft or by breach of a confidential relationship, in a
manner not easily susceptible of discovery or proof.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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technological advancement will remain undisclosed. Society loses the
benefits of immediately understanding the technology through patent
disclosure and of studying and improving upon the technology while
the patent is enforceable.173 The secrecy of the invention may remain
undisclosed for decades longer than a patent term.174
The use of third party, independent public use prior art is different
than the situation in Pennock. Although the uses that constituted
public use in Pennock may have been uses by persons other than the
patentee, the uses were not independent because they resulted from
sales of hoses made via Pennock and Sellers’s patented process.175 In
contrast, about sixty years later, the Supreme Court confirmed that
third party, independent use can establish the public use statutory
bar.176 In that case, however, the patent holder conceded that others
had publicly used the claimed invention before the critical date.
Although the argument would be frivolous today, the patent holder
was arguing that public use by others, without the consent of the
inventor, could not invalidate a patent.177 The argument presented in
this paper is not that the AIA overruled that long-standing doctrine.
Rather, this paper argues that, to further important patent law polices,
AIA § 102(a)(1) public use prior art should not include independent,
third party use that is hidden and inaccessible to the public.
From 1993 to 2013, when determining the validity of USPTOissued patents, the Federal Circuit has considered third party,
independent uses of a claimed invention under the § 102(b) public
use prior art category at least twenty-four times.178 In at least eight of
173. Although the patent holder contains the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the invention, others
can use the information contained in the written description section to improve on the claimed invention
or invent something different (non-infringing). Trade secret protection lacks the immediate benefit that
patent disclosure provides to society.
174. For example, the Coca-Cola recipe has been a trade secret for over one hundred years. CocaCola Moves ‘Secret Formula’ to New Vault in Atlanta, NY DAILY NEWS (Dec. 9, 2011 12:04 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/eats/coca-cola-moves-secret-formula-new-vault-atlanta-article1.989170.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 62–70.
176. Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U.S. 267, 273 (1887).
177. Interestingly, under the Patent Act of 1836, public use by others, without the consent of the
inventor, could not invalidate a patent! Andrews, 123 U.S. at 271.
178. Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2013); MySpace, Inc. v.
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these cases, the third party use would not have qualified as patentdefeating prior art if the definition of public use did not include
hidden, inaccessible, private use. 179 For eight of the twenty-four
cases, the outcome under a new public use definition was unclear,
either because the factual record was insufficient to determine the
outcome or because the alleged use was very close to what might be
considered public, depending on the breadth of the new definition.180
These cases primarily break down into three categories of third party
public use: (1) patentee versus a corporate third party user; 181 (2)

GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Orion IP, L.L.C. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 974
(Fed. Cir. 2010); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Clock Spring,
L.P. v. Wrapmaster, Inc., 560 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky
Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1016–17 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys.,
Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 501 F.3d 1364, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Eolas Techs.,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Emergency Fuel, LLC v. Penzoil-Quaker
State Co., 71 F. App’x. 826, 833–34 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Lacks Indus., Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle
Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d
728, 737 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Comfort Silkie Co. v. Seifert, No. 98-1476, 1999 WL 507166, at *1 (Fed. Cir. July 16,
1999); Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 180 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Baxter Int’l, Inc.
v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1561–62 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); Beachcombers v. Wildewood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v. Varian Assocs., No. 93-1421, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1493, at *5–*6 (Fed.
Cir. Jan. 6, 1994); Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
179. Dey, 715 F.3d at 1353; Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1334; Emergency Fuel, 71 F. App’x. at 833–34; Juicy
Whip, 292 F.3d at 737; Comfort Silkie, 1999 WL 507166, at *1; Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1057; Beachcombers,
31 F.3d 1159–60; Nat’l Research, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1493.
180. See ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 866; McKechnie, 322 F.3d at 1349; Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.,
303 F.3d at 1306. See generally Star Scientific, 655 F.3d 1364; Clock Spring, 560 F.3d 1317; Adenta,
501 F.3d 1364; Ormco, 463 F.3d 1299; Ultra-Tex, 204 F.3d 1360.
181. See, e.g., infra notes 184–192 (explaining the facts of Juicy Whip, 292 F.3d 728); Dey, 715 F.3d
at 1356 (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment finding the patent claims invalid due to a
lack of novelty because whether the failure of some of the individuals in a clinical trial to return the
patented drug samples constitutes public use was a genuine issue of material fact); Ransomes v. Great
Dane Power Equip., Inc., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6172, at *13–14 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 4, 2000) (considering
a third party lawn mower control system to be prior art–presumably as public use before the critical
date–and reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment finding the patent claim invalid because
obviousness was a genuine issue of fact for the jury); Finnigan, 180 F.3d at 1357, 1367 (reversing
commission’s finding of invalidity on the patent’s claimed “quadrupole ion trap” method because
uncorroborated witness testimony of a hidden, inaccessible, private use occurred, which would have
constituted public use, was insufficient as a matter of law to meet the clear and convincing evidence
standard required to prove invalidity); Mendenhall, 5 F.3d at 1559, 1564.
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patentee versus individual third party user; 182 and (3) laboratory
sharing between colleagues.183
1. Patentee Versus Corporate Third Party User
A good example of this type of third party public use is in Juicy
Whip v. Orange Bang.184 In Juicy Whip, the patentee claimed a postmix beverage dispenser that is designed to look like a pre-mix
dispenser; essentially, the patent was for a vending machine that
“stores beverage syrup concentrate and water in separate locations
until the beverage is ready to be dispensed” with a “transparent bowl
that is filled with a fluid that simulates the appearance of the
dispensed beverage.”185 The court considered two separate beverage
dispensers as prior art under § 102(b) public use.186 The first was a
“makeshift” dispenser “converted [from] a pre-mix dispenser into a
post-mix dispenser by removing the pre-mix nozzle, plugging the
remaining hole, and installing a post-mix valve arrangement in the
base of the pre-mix dispenser.” 187 One customer used a makeshift
dispenser for one month.188 The facts do not indicate how long the
only other customer used this type of dispenser. The second was a
“post-mix dispenser with a clear bowl placed on top of it.”189 The
second design was used by one customer, for a total of about six
weeks.190 Because of the broad definition of § 102(b) public use, the
patent holder did not even argue on appeal that these did not qualify
as prior art.191 Therefore, out of millions of vending machines in the
182. Comfort Silkie, 1999 WL 507166, at *2 (affirming summary judgment finding patent claiming a
special baby blanket invalid due to a lack of novelty because a single third party took similar blankets
into public places); Beachcombers, 31 F.3d at 1156; see also Finnigan, 180 F.3d at 1357, 1359–60
(explanation at supra note 181).
183. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1334-35; Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1059; Nat’l Research, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
1493, at *2–4.
184. See generally 292 F.3d 728 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
185. Id. at 731–32.
186. Id. at 734, 736–37.
187. Id. at 734–35.
188. Id. at 735.
189. Id.
190. See Juicy Whip, 292 F.3d at 743.
191. Id. at 737.
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United States, 192 three of them—designed to appear as pre-mix
beverage dispensers to the public—practiced the same technology as
claimed in the patent for a very short period of time and constituted a
patent-defeating public use of the invention.193
2. Patentee Versus Individual Third Party User
Illustrative of the second type of third party public use is
Beachcombers v. Wildewood Creative Products.194 In Beachcombers,
the Federal Circuit upheld a jury verdict finding that a § 102(b)
public use anticipated the patented liquid-filled kaleidoscope.195 The
public use consisted of a display of a similar liquid-filled
kaleidoscope device to about twenty-five guests at a house party,
merely one month before the critical date.196 The court distinguished
Moleculon,197 reasoning that the guests were under no obligation of
secrecy and thus the social demonstration constituted a public use.198

192. Olga Kharif, Technology: Vending Machines Get Smart to Accommodate the Cashless,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-29/vendingmachines-get-smart-to-accommodate-the-cashless (noting that there are currently five million vending
machines in the U.S.).
193. See Juicy Whip, 292 F.3d at 735–36, 743. The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the district
court and found the patent was valid because the oral testimony was insufficient to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the patent was invalid. Id. at 743. For purposes of this discussion, what matters
most is that the Federal Circuit did not state that the alleged use did not qualify as public use; had
Orange Bang documented the use better, Juicy Whip’s patent would be invalid. Id.
194. See generally 31 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
195. Id. at 1160. Before reaching the public use issue, the court overturned the jury’s finding that the
patent was invalid for indefiniteness. Id. at 1158–59. In finding the party display of a similar
kaleidoscope constituted a public use, the court upheld the jury’s finding that claims 1, 6, and 11 were
anticipated (and invalid) but upheld claims 8, 9, and 13 because the limitations in those dependent
claims were not present in the kaleidoscope displayed at the party. Id. at 1160–63. This finding was to
no avail, however, because defendant Wildewood’s kaleidoscope, which tracked the kaleidoscope
displayed at the party, did not include those limitations and thus upheld the jury’s finding of no
infringement. Id. at 1163.
196. Id. at 1159–60.
197. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (the “Rubik’s Cube” case) (finding that despite
the lack of express confidentiality, the inventor maintained control over the cubical puzzle at all times
when he showed the invention to several friends and his supervisor at work).
198. Beachcombers, 31 F.3d at 1160. Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl cited Beachcombers as an
example of how § 102(b) doctrines have become “traps for unwary inventors and impose extreme
results to no real purpose.” 157 CONG. REC. S1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing Beachcombers, 31
F.3d at 1159–60).
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3. Laboratory Sharing Between Colleagues
In addition to the Eolas example, explained in the introduction,199
another example of third party laboratory sharing between colleagues
is Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Labratories, Inc.200 In Baxter,
the Federal Circuit held that a patent for a sealless centrifuge used to
separate blood into its components lacked novelty because it was in
public use.201 The prior public use resulted from a sealless centrifuge
built by two research scientists at the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) prior to the critical date.202 The court found that the use of the
centrifuge in the NIH laboratory constituted a patent-invalidating
public use because the third party inventor did not make any effort to
keep his centrifuge a secret, “others at NIH came into his laboratory
and observed the centrifuge in operation, including co-workers, who
were under no duty to maintain it as confidential,” and NIH was a
public building.203
C. Changes in the AIA Make This Problem Potentially Disastrous
for US Patent Law
Three changes to U.S. patent law made by the AIA intensify the
problem of hidden third party public use and threaten to undermine
the goal of promoting innovations in science and the useful arts.
Because of these substantive changes to prior art, Robert Armitrage
explains that to include third party hidden, inaccessible uses as public
use would be “truly absurd.”204 First, due to the switch from FTI to
FITF, the AIA eliminated the § 102(a) “known and used by others”
category of prior art.205 Therefore, all of the former § 102(a) novelty
cases will now be shoehorned into § 102(a)(1) public use prior art

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See supra Introduction; see supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
88 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1058–61.
Armitage, supra note 127, at 55.
Id. at 46–47.
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under the AIA.206 This structural amendment increases the scope of
the § 102(a)(1) public use category and increases magnitude of the
hidden, inaccessible, private use problem.207
The second, and most dramatic, change is that the AIA removed
the geographic restrictions on § 102(b) public use and § 102(a)
“known and used by others.” 208 Before the AIA was enacted, in
contrast to “patented” or “printed publication” prior art, the public
use or “used by others” prior art event must have taken place in the
United States.209 Therefore, if an inventor implemented an improved
process in a Russian factory, if an inventor let one friend try his
invention in a Malaysian apartment, or if in an inventor showed his
invention to a single colleague in Japan, the activity could constitute
§ 102(a)(1) public use if the AIA adopts the same pre-AIA definition.
These types of foreign uses differ significantly from patents and
printed publications in other countries because, unlike in the three
examples, patent applications and printed publications share the new
technology with the world (or at least make it accessible to the
world).
The last noteworthy change is that the AIA removed the 170-yearold automatic grace period. 210 Under the AIA, there is no grace
period for inventions unless and until the inventor makes a public
disclosure of his invention.211 Therefore, any prior art activity that
206. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
207. See, e.g., Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(applying “known or used by others” category); Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Div., Nat’l Lead Co., 218 F.2d
72, 73 (5th Cir. 1955) (applying “known or used by others” category). Now, they must qualify as prior
art under the public use category instead of the “known or used by others” category. Compare 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (2006), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
208. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2006), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). See also Armitage,
supra note 127, at 46–47, 51.
209. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986). This case is commonly thought of as
obscure, but at least the thesis was catalogued and potentially accessible. Id. at 899. Imagine a case
where the same information was orally conveyed to a colleague in a laboratory or displayed to a family
member in a private residence.
210. See Armitage, supra note 127, at 67.
211. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
Exceptions [to First Inventor to File rule in section (a)]—
(1) Disclosures made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention.—A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed
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qualifies as a public use and takes place before the effective
application date or the inventor’s own public disclosure will
invalidate the patent.212 Before the AIA, even if an inventor did not
make any public disclosures or publish his invention, any public use
activity occurring within the year preceding the effective application
date could not serve as prior art to show a lack of novelty or
nonobviousness.213
These three changes radically increase the scope of the public use
bar and thus dramatically more prior art events will fall under the
new § 102(a)(1) public use patentability bar. The U.S. patent system
is already in trouble because it provides poor notice.214 Patents fail to
function as property in many fields of art. 215 Notwithstanding the
“patent failure” and the fact that one patent per year is invalidated by
third party public use, inventors and investors have continued to rely
on patent protection to reward them for their innovation.216 However,
these inventors and investors will likely stop believing in the
invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if—(A)
the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the
subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B)
the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the
inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly
or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. (2) Disclosures appearing in
applications and patents.—A disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under
subsection (a)(2) if—(A) the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly
from the inventor or a joint inventor; (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such
subject matter was effectively filed under subsection (a)(2), been publicly disclosed by
the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed
directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (C) the subject matter
disclosed and the claimed invention, not later than the effective filing date of the claimed
invention, were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to
the same person.
Id.
212. Armitage, supra note 127, at 67.
213. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
214. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 147–64 (2008) (concluding that patents fail to function “as
property” due to the lack of notice provided by the American patent system). The AIA makes the notice
problem in the United States worse because the new global public use prior art imposes additional
search and litigation costs. In contrast to the former system, defendants will now search for public use
events in foreign countries such as Russia and Malaysia. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (2012).
215. BESSEN, supra note 214 at 51–52.
216. See id. at 70–72, 92–93.
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profitability of U.S. patents if courts retain the broad pre-AIA
definition of public use.217 The expansion of the problem of hidden,
inaccessible, private use will make patent validity highly
unpredictable. 218 The changes in the AIA will likely invalidate so
many valuable patents that inventors and investors no longer seek
patent protection. To save the U.S. patent system and promote
American innovation, AIA § 102(a)(1) public use should not include
hidden, inaccessible, private use.
D. Excluding Hidden, Inaccessible, Private Use from the Prior Art
Furthers Important Patent Policies
In addition, excluding hidden, inaccessible private use from the
public use bar will further important patent policies. When
determining whether to apply the public use bar, the Federal Circuit
looks to whether application of the statutory bar will promote the
underlying policies. 219 In fact, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly
asserted that the policies underlying the public use bar, “in effect,
define it.”220 Turning to the four policies underlying the public use
statutory bar, excluding hidden, inaccessible public use advances the
quid pro quo and prompt disclosure rationales and leaves the
detrimental public reliance and channeling rationales unharmed.
There is no concern about detrimental public reliance on the new
innovation because, by definition, the public cannot possibly think
something is in the public domain if the only use is hidden and
inaccessible from members of society. In addition, independent, third
party prior art has no effect on the channeling rationale because that

217. Id. at 88.
218. Id. at 10.
219. See, e.g., Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
220. See, e.g., TP Labs., Inc., v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (The
public use bar was inapplicable because “none of the policies which underlie the public use bar and
which, in effect, define it have been shown to be violated.”); cf. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys.,
Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng’g Inc., 904 F.2d
1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990)) (“‘[T]he policies or purposes underlying the on sale bar [of section
102(b)], in effect, define it.’”).
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rationale only applies to first party inventors who commercialize
their invention.221
Excluding inaccessible uses from the public use prior art category
will advance the quid pro quo rationale because many inventions in
public use, as defined in pre-AIA jurisprudence, are not
commercially developed. The public use bar rests on the assumption
that if an invention was in public use, then society receives the
benefit of that invention through commercial development or
otherwise.222 However, this assumption is often incorrect under the
old definition of public use because if the public use is hidden or too
obscure, then society is unaware of its existence.223 For example, in
Egbert, had Mr. Barnes not told his friends about the new corset
steels and not applied for a patent on them, the world would be
unaware of the invention and women all over America would have
continued to suffer from constantly breaking corset steels. 224 The
patent-defeating public use—letting Ms. Egbert use the corset
steels—shared no knowledge with the world.225 In addition, once an
invention is in public use, the incentive of patent protection is
removed from the equation, and there is often no economic incentive
to develop or commercialize the technology.226 Raising the public use
bar to exclude hidden, inaccessible uses increases the likelihood that
a public use actually places the invention in the public domain and
decreases the chance of a trivial use erecting the patentability bar.
Rejecting the pre-AIA definition of public use furthers the prompt
disclosure policy for two reasons. First, without good notice and
predictability, persons with skill in the relevant fields of art may lose
confidence in the patent system’s ability to financially reward the
innovations. This concern will motivate inventors and businesses to
keep their inventions secret and rely on trade secret protections rather
221. See infra Part III.A (discussing the continued vitality of Metallizing).
222. See TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 970–72.
223. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 335 (1881).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 337.
226. See Kitch, supra note 13, at 266; Roin, supra note 50, at 503 (arguing that pharmaceutical drugs
are not commercialized without the economic incentive of patent protection).
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than risk disclosing their invention through a patent application.
Excluding hidden, inaccessible prior art will increase predictability in
the U.S. patent system and will foster trust and reliance in patent
protection. Second, the first-inventor-to-file priority system and the
removal of the automatic grace period already provide sufficient
incentive to promptly disclose new technology. 227 Therefore,
requiring public accessibility in § 102(a)(1) public use will promote
the prompt public disclosure policy.
E. The Difference Between Hidden, Inaccessible, Private Use and
Secret Use Is Insignificant
The final reason why courts should discontinue the old pre-AIA
definition of public use is because there is an insignificant difference
between hidden, inaccessible public use and secret use. It is wellestablished law that “when an asserted prior use is not that of the
applicant, § 102(b) is not a bar when that prior use or knowledge is
not available to the public.”228 The Federal Circuit, however, draws a
very fine line between available to the public and secret use.229 This
distinction is senseless and rests on hypothetical possibilities rather
than reality.230 There is no material difference between an invention
known by one person, other than the inventor, bound by secrecy and
an invention known by one person, not bound by secrecy, who tells
no one of the invention. The fact that the non-inventor with
knowledge could have shared the innovative knowledge with the
227. 157 CONG. REC. S1371 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
228. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing W.L.
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) (reasoning that third party
secret commercial activity, more than one year before the patent application of another, is not a § 102(b)
bar); 1 IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE § 4.41 (6th ed. 1995) (“Where the commercially
advantageous, secret use is by a third party and even though that use is for a period more than one year
before the applicant’s filing date, it cannot constitute a statutory time bar under § 102(b).”) (emphasis in
original); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058–59 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (third party
prior use accessible to the public is a § 102(b) bar)); see also Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v. Varian
Assocs., No. 93-1421, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1493, *10 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1994).
229. See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 339 (1881) (Miller, J., dissenting) (“I am at a loss to
know the line between a private and a public use.”).
230. Id.
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whole world is logically unimportant; he or she did not tell the whole
world, so the general public does not know of the invention. In
reality, in neither case is the inventive knowledge available to the
public.
In determining whether a claimed invention is available to the
public, the important questions should be how many people know
about the invention and who knows about the invention. 231 The
answer is the same in either case: one person other than the inventor
knows about the invention. The important part should be whether the
user actually told someone.
III. ISSUES RAISED BY A NEW INTERPRETATION OF PUBLIC USE
Concluding that the AIA eliminates inaccessible, private, third
party use from the public use prior art category does not end the
judicial inquiry into the meaning of the AIA’s § 102. Rather, this
departure from the formerly established definition of public use
brings to light several interesting questions. For example, does the
AIA eliminate the Metallizing doctrine and allow first party secret
commercial use prior to filing a patent application? If public use does
not include inaccessible, hidden, third party uses, what is the standard
for determining public use under the AIA? What about private
inventors and small business entities who invent the subject matter of
a patent and use the invention but do not file for a patent—can the
patentee exclude them from using their invention? Does the new
definition of public use also apply to the on sale bar? The discussion
below addresses these issues in turn.

231. See New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Dyk, J., dissenting) (arguing that the drill bits were not in public use because they were used
underground at the worksite and only one-person not under an explicit duty of confidentiality actually
knew of the drill bit).
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A. Metallizing and the Problem of First Party Secret Commercial
Use
Contrary to the widely held belief that a narrow interpretation of
§ 102(a)(1) public use will overrule Metallizing, the Metallizing
doctrine should survive notwithstanding the addition of the public
availability requirement of public use.232 This surprising result occurs
because Metallizing established a non-statutory forfeiture theory,
separate from the public use statutory bar.233 Although the public use
bar was well established at the time of the decision, Judge Hand did
not invoke it but rather described it as a forfeiture.234 That the Federal
Circuit has repeatedly noted that the secret commercial use bar only
apples to the secret user, not anyone else, bolsters the argument that
the restriction on patentability is not a public use statutory bar.235
In addition, public policy, which effectively defines the public use
bar, militates against allowing secret commercial users to patent their
232. See Taskalos, supra note 56, at 701 (arguing that even applying a public accessibility standard
does not clearly eliminate the Metallizing doctrine).
233. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946).
234. Id. (“[I]n [a prior decision] we confused two separate doctrines: (1) The effect upon his right to a
patent of the inventor’s competitive exploitation of his machine or of his process; (2) the contribution
which a prior use by another person makes to the art. Both do indeed come within the phrase, ‘prior
use’; but the first is a defence [sic] for quite different reasons from the second . . . . [I]t is a condition
upon an inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready
for patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.” (emphasis added) (citing
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 7 (1829))). Judge Hand continues:
It is true that for the limited period of two years he was allowed to do so, possibly in
order to give him time to prepare an application . . . . But if he goes beyond that period of
probation, he forfeits his right regardless of how little the public may have learned about
the invention. . . .
Id. (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit calls the Metallizing ruling a “forfeiture theory.” D.L. Auld
Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147–48 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The ‘forfeiture’ theory
expressed in Metallizing parallels the statutory scheme of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the intent of which is to
preclude attempts by the inventor or his assignee to profit from commercial use of an invention for more
than a year before an application for patent is filed.”).
235. D.L. Auld, 714 F.2d at 1147–48 (“If Auld produced an emblem by the method of the invention
and offered that emblem for sale before the critical date, the right to a patent on the method must be
declared forfeited.” (citing Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520)); see also W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v.
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing D.L. Auld and Metallizing) (referring to the
one year commercial trade secret activities as a “forfeiture,” not as a public use bar, applicable only to
the secret commercial users’ activities and holding that “[t]here is no reason or statutory basis” on which
the “secret commercialization” by the other, non-applicant, party “could be held a bar.”); Kinzenbaw v.
Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520).
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inventions.236 In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court
reaffirmed Judge Hand’s challenging rationale, stating that “‘[i]t is a
condition upon an inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not exploit
his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must
content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.’”237 Allowing
secret commercial use would undermine the channeling rationale by
allowing inventors to choose secrecy first and later rely on patent
protection.238 In addition, overruling the Metallizing decision would
violate the prompt disclosure policy.239 Before the AIA took effect,
the nomenclature of this case law doctrine was irrelevant to its
continued existence.240 With its continued existence at stake, courts
should uphold the Metallizing doctrine as an equitable forfeiture of
the right to patent an invention.
B. Prohibiting Small-Entity Inventors from Using Their Inventions
One potential side effect of the proposed interpretation is that
small entities would be prohibited from using inventions that they
invented before the patent holder invented the claimed invention. In
one sense, this result is unavoidable; what else would happen through
a switch from a FTI system to a FITF system? However, this
consequence will occur more frequently because the removal of
hidden, inaccessible uses from the public use prior art category
results in more valid patents. Arguably, this result is a good thing for
all of the reasons articulated in Part II of this paper.
However, many critics characterize this result as a harmful side
effect of the AIA’s adoption of the first-inventor-to-file system. 241
These critics argue that small-business entities will suffer because
236. Taskalos, supra note 106, at 706–08; see supra Part I.B (describing the four policies underlying
the public use statutory bar).
237. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 68 (1998) (quoting Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon
Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946)).
238. Morgan, supra note 149, at 31
239. Id.
240. Id. at 31–32.
241. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 111, at 1041; Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A Superior System for
the United States, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 779, 782 (1991).
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they have fewer resources and will be slower to apply for a patent on
new technologies. 242 Section 5 of the AIA already contains a
provision guarding against this concern.243 Harmonizing with over a
dozen industrialized nations,244 this protection for prior users creates
a limited defense for inventors who commercially used the patented
technology at least one year before the effective filing date or date on
which the claimed invention was disclosed publicly.245 If this limited
defense inadequately protects small entity inventors, there are a
variety of alterations Congress can make to strengthen these rights.246
C. Interpreting the “On Sale” Statutory Bar Under the AIA
The argument presented in Part II—that hidden, inaccessible use
should not be prior art—applies with equal force in favor of
eliminating private, inaccessible third party sales and third party
secret sales. The concerns with removing all private sales from the on
sale prior art category are similar to those concerns with overruling
Metallizing; it is axiomatic that an on sale event is commercial in
nature. Thus, even if the new § 102(a)(1) on sale prior includes a
public accessibility requirement, the Metallizing doctrine would still
create an equitable forfeiture for first party secret sales.247
The “on sale” prior art category differs from the public use
category in two respects. First, the on sale statutory bar does not
contain the word “public”; § 102(a)(1) of the AIA does not bar
inventions “on sale publicly” or “on public sale.” 248 Without the
word “public” in the prior art category, one could argue that the

242. See Bagley, supra note 111, at 1041 (arguing that a move by the United States to a first to file
system will likely have negative ramifications for small entity inventors).
243. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 5, 125 Stat. 285 (2011).
244. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS
DEFENSE 10–13, available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/20120113-pur_report.pdf.
245. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012); see also Gomez, supra note 110, at 65, 76, 80.
246. See USPTO, supra note 244, at 13 (listing a variety of prior user rights elements that can be
changed).
247. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing in favor of retaining the Metallizing doctrine as an
equitable forfeiture).
248. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
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public availability is not required for sales.249 Second, the on sale bar
differs from the public use bar because, unlike secret uses of the
claimed innovation, secret sales prevent both the seller (first party)
and an independent third party from obtaining a patent.250 Thus, the
on sale bar on secret sales is a true statutory bar in that it applies
equally to all inventors. 251 Whether the definition of on sale in
§ 102(a)(1) should retain its pre-AIA definition is a very close
question and requires a more in-depth discussion.
D. If the AIA Excludes Hidden, Inaccessible, Private Use, What
Constitutes Public Use?
Concluding that hidden, inaccessible, private use does not comport
with the policies behind the public use statutory bar leaves open the
issue of how to define § 102(a)(1) public use. The issue of where to
draw the line between private use and public use is difficult. The
Federal Circuit states that “[i]n general, ‘[a]ccessibility goes to the
issue of whether interested members of the relevant public could
obtain the information if they wanted to.’”252 To honor the evident
public availability requirement that the AIA adds to public use prior
art category, courts should incorporate some sort of requirement that
the general public could actually access knowledge of the use. Thus,
courts should find that a use is public if “if it ‘has been disseminated
or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and
ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable
diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend therefrom the
essentials of the claimed invention without need of further research
or experimentation.’”253

249. This argument is contrary to the argument presented above that “otherwise available to the
public” clause defines the terms that precede it. See supra text accompanying notes 134–135. It is
curious however, why the term “public use” includes the word “public” and the “on sale” bar does not.
250. Morgan, supra note 149, at 32.
251. Id.
252. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Constant
v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
253. Id. (citing In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
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CONCLUSION
From 1993 to 2013, when determining the validity of USPTOissued patents, the Federal Circuit considered third party,
independent uses of a claimed invention under the § 102(b) public
use prior art category.254 Three changes made by the AIA–the switch
to a first-inventor-to-file system, the removal of geographic
restrictions on public use, and the removal of the automatic one-year
grace period–increase the scope of the public use prior art category.
Thus, dramatically more prior art events will fall under the new
§ 102(a)(1) public use patentability bar. If not prevented, the problem
of hidden, inaccessible, private “public use” will grow and
potentially cripple the U.S. patent system. When patent practitioners
and technology investors lose faith in U.S. patent system’s ability to
reward, they will discontinue seeking patent protection. In other
words, hidden, inaccessible, private prior art may invalidate so many
valuable patents that inventors and investors no longer seek patent
protection because the risk of invalidity is so high. To accomplish the
constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts” § 102(a)(1) must include a public accessibility
requirement.255
In addition, statutory interpretation of AIA § 102(a)(1) militates
that public use prior art events be publicly accessible. The text
plainly indicates that public availability is a requirement to qualify as
public use prior art. Furthermore, the legislative history and spirit of
the AIA favor excluding hidden, inaccessible, uses from the public
use prior art category. To save the U.S. patent system and spur
innovation in America, AIA § 102(a)(1) public use cannot include
hidden, inaccessible, private use.

254. See supra note 178.
255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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